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Multi Fault Detection and Correction Using Error Correction Codes and Parseval Checks

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ABSTRACT: Digital filters are widely used in signal processing and communication systems. In some cases, the reliability of those systems is critical, and fault tolerant filter implementations are needed. Over the years, many techniques that exploit the filters' structure and properties to achieve fault tolerance have been proposed. As technology scales, it enables more complex systems that incorporate many filters. In those complex systems, it is common that some of the filters operate in parallel, for example, by applying the same filter to different input signals. For some applications, an interesting option is to use algorithmic-based fault tolerance (ABFT) techniques that try to exploit the algorithmic properties to detect and correct errors. Signal processing and communication applications are well suited for ABFT. Recently, a simple technique that exploits the presence of parallel filters to achieve fault tolerance has been presented. In this brief, that idea is generalized to show that parallel filters can be protected using many techniques in which each filter is the equivalent of a bit in a traditional ECC. This new scheme allows more efficient protection when the number of parallel filters is large. The technique is evaluated using a case study of parallel finite impulse response filters, Error correction codes (ECCs), parseval checks, showing the effectiveness in terms of protection and implementation cost.

KEYWORDS: Error correction codes (ECCs), fast Fourier transforms (FFTs), soft errors, parseval checks, Parity-SOS-ECC.

I. INTRODUCTION

The complexity of communications and signal processing circuits increases every year. This is made possible by the CMOS technology scaling that enables the integration of more and more transistors on a single device. This increased complexity makes the circuits more vulnerable to errors. At the same time, the scaling means that transistors operate with lower voltages and are more susceptible to errors caused by noise and

Manufacturing variations. The importance of radiation-induced soft errors also increases as technology scales [2]. Soft errors can change the logical value of a circuit node creating a temporary error that can affect the system operation. To ensure that soft errors do not affect the operation of a given circuit, a wide variety of techniques can be used [3]. These include the use of special manufacturing processes for the integrated circuits like, for example, the silicon on insulator. Another option is to design basic circuit blocks or complete design libraries to minimize the probability of soft errors. Finally, it is also possible to add redundancy at the system level to detect and correct errors.

One classical example is the use of triple modular redundancy (TMR) that triples a block and votes among the three outputs to detect and correct errors. The main issue with those soft errors mitigation techniques is that they require a large overhead in terms of circuit implementation. For example, for TMR, the overhead is >200%. This is because the unprotected module is replicated three times (which requires a 200% overhead versus the unprotected module), and additionally, voters are needed to correct the errors making the overhead >200%. This overhead is excessive for many applications. Another approach is to try to use the algorithmic properties of the circuit to detect/correct errors. This is commonly referred to as algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) [4]. This strategy can reduce the overhead required to protect a circuit.Signal processing and communications circuits are well suited for ABFT as they have regular structures and many algorithmic properties [4]. Over the years, many ABFT techniques have been proposed to protect the basic blocks that are commonly used in those circuits. Several works have considered



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the protection of digital filters [5], [6]. For example, the use of replication using reduced precision copies of the filter has been proposed as an alternative to TMR but with a lower cost [7]. The knowledge of the distribution of the filter output has also been recently exploited to detect and correct errors with lower overheads [8]. The protection of fast Fourier transforms (FFTs) has also been widely studied. As signal-processing circuits become more complex, it is common to find several filters or FFTs operating in parallel.

The presence of parallel filters or FFTs creates an opportunity to implement ABFT techniques for the entire group of parallel modules instead of for each one independently. This has been studied for digital filters initially in [16] where two filters were considered. More recently, a general scheme based on the use of error correction codes (ECCs) has been proposed [17]. In this technique, the idea is that each filter can be the equivalent of a bit in an ECC and parity check bits can be computed using addition. This technique can be used for operations, in which the output of the sum of several inputs is the sum of the individual outputs. This is true for any linear operation as, for example, the discrete Fourier transforms (DFT).

II. EXISTING SYSTEM

2.1 PARALLEL FFT PROTECTION USING ECCs

This technique provides new alternatives to protect parallel FFTs that can be more efficient than protecting each of the FFTs independently.



Fig 2.1. Parallel FFT protection using ECCs

The starting point for our work is the protection scheme based on the use of ECCs that was presented in [17] for digital filters. This scheme is shown in Fig. 1. In this example, a simple single error correction Hamming code [18] is used. The original system Consists of four FFT modules and three redundant modules is added to detect and correct errors. The inputs to the three redundant modules are linear combinations of the inputs and they are used to check linear combinations of the outputs. For example, the input to the first redundant module is

x5 = x1 + x2 + x3(2.1)

and since the DFT is a linear operation, its output z5 can be used to check that (2.2)

z5 = z1 + z2 + z3

This will be denoted as c1 check. The same reasoning applies to the other two redundant modules that will provide checks c^2 and c^3 . Based on the differences observed on each of the checks, the module on which the error has occurred can be determined. The different patterns and the corresponding errors are summarized in Table I. Once the module in error is known, the error can be corrected by reconstructing its output using the remaining modules. For example, for an error affecting *z*1, this can be done as follows:

z1c[n] = z5[n] - z2[n] - z3[n](2.3)

Similar correction equations can be used to correct errors on the other modules. More advanced ECCs can be used to correct errors on multiple modules if that is needed in a given application. The overhead of this technique, as discussed



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in [17], is lower than TMR as the number of redundant FFTs is related to the logarithm of the number of original FFTs. For example, to protect four FFTs, three redundant FFTs are needed, but to protect eleven, the number of redundant FFTs in only four. This shows how the overhead decreases with the number of FFTs.

Table.2.1. Error location in the hamming code

No error
1.147 611 51
Z 1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Zs
Z6
Z7

2.2 PARITY-SOS FAULT-TOLERANT PARALLEL FFTS

Many techniques have been proposed to protect the FFT. One of them is the Sum of Squares (SOSs) check [4] that can be used to detect errors. The SOS check is based on the Parseval theorem that states that the SOSs of the inputs to the FFT are equal to the SOSs of the outputs of the FFT except for a scaling factor. This relationship can be used to detect errors with low overhead as one multiplication is needed for each input or output sample (two multiplications and adders for SOS per sample).

For parallel FFTs, the SOS check can be combined with the ECC approach to reduce the protection overhead. Since the SOS check can only detect errors, the ECC part should be able to implement the correction. This can be done using the equivalent of a simple parity bit for all the FFTs. In addition, the SOS check is used on each FFT to detect errors. When an error is detected, the output of the parity FFT can be Redundant (the parity) FFT is added that has the sum of the inputs to the original FFTs as input. An SOS check is also added to each original FFT. In case an error is detected (using P1, P2, P3, P4), the correction can be done by recomposing the FFT in error using the output of the parity FFT(X) and the rest of the FFT outputs. For example, if an error occurs in the first FFT, P1 will be set and the error can be corrected by doing

x1c = x - x2 - x3 - x4



Fig 2.2. Parity-SOS fault-tolerant parallel FFTs.



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This combination of a parity FFT and the SOS check reduces the number of additional FFTs to just one and may, therefore, reduce the protection overhead. In the following, this scheme will be referred to as parity-SOS.

2.3 PARITY-SOS-ECC FAULT-TOLERANT PARALLEL FFTS

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Another possibility to combine the SOS check and the ECC approach is instead of using an SOS check per FFT, use an ECC for the SOS checks. Then as in the parity-SOS scheme, an additional parity FFT is used to correct the errors. The main benefit over the first parity-SOS scheme is to reduce the number of SOS checks needed. The error location process is the same as for the ECC scheme in Fig. 1 and correction is as in the parity-SOS scheme. In the following, this scheme will be referred to as parity-SOS-ECC.

The overheads of the two proposed schemes can be initially estimated using the number of additional FFTs and SOS check blocks needed. This information is summarized II for a set of k original FFT modules assuming k is a power of two. It can be observed that the two proposed schemes reduce the number of additional FFTs to just one. In addition, the second technique also reduces the number of SOS checks. In Section III, a detailed evaluation for an FPGA implementation is discussed to illustrate the relative overheads of the proposed techniques.



Fig 2.3. parity-SOS-ECC fault-tolerant parallel FFT

In all the techniques discussed, soft errors can also affect the elements added for protection. For the ECC technique, the protection of these elements was discussed in [17]. In the case of the redundant or parity FFTs, an error will have no effect as it will not propagate to the data outputs and will not trigger a correction. In the case of SOS checks, an error will trigger a correction when actually there is no error on the FFT. This will cause an unnecessary correction but will also produce the correct result.



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Finally, errors on the detection and correction blocks in Figs. 2 and 3 can propagate errors to the outputs. In our implementations, those blocks are protected with TMR. The same applies for the adders used to compute the inputs to the redundant FFTs in Fig. 1 or to the SOS checks in Fig. 3. The triplication of these blocks has a small impact on circuit complexity as they are much simpler than the FFT computations.

A final observation is that the ECC scheme can detect all errors that exceed a given threshold (given by the quantization used to implement the FFTs) [17]. On the other hand, the SOS check detects most errors but does not guarantee the detection of all errors [4]. Therefore, to compare the three techniques for a given implementation, fault injection experiments should be done to determine the percentage of errors that are actually corrected. This means that an evaluation has to be done both in terms of overhead and error coverage.

III. PROPOSED SYSTEM

3.1 PARALLEL CORRECTION METHOD

In this method, we are using parseval check method to detect the errors in the original module. By using this method we can able to detect more than one error in the original module . After that redundant modules are is used to correct those errors.



Fig.3.1. Parallel correction method

In partial summation method, we just add the inputs of the FFTs and it will be compare with the first output of the FFTs. In case, these two values are equal no errors in that particular FFT. If it is not equal threes is an error in that FFT. In this method, original module is enough to detect the errors in the FFTs. So, that no need for additional detection circuits. For that reason area and power will be effectively reduced in this method.

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Fig.3.1.2. Implementation of the SOS checks

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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The two proposed schemes and the ECC scheme presented in [17] have been implemented on an FPGA and evaluated both in terms of overhead and error coverage. A four-point decimation-in-frequency FFT core is used to compute the FFT iteratively. This core has been developed to implement MIMO-OFDM for wireless systems. The implementation of the four-point FFT core is shown in Fig. 4. The number of FFT points is programmable and the rotation coefficients are calculated on-line for each stage and stored in registers. For the evaluation, a 1024 points FFT is configured with five stages calculation (log41024 = 5), so in total $5 \square 1024 = 5120$ cycles are needed to calculate the FFT for 1024 input samples. The inputs are 12-bit wide and the outputs are 14-bit wide. For the redundant FFT, the bit widths are extended to 14 and 16 bit, respectively, to cover the larger dynamic range (as the inputs are the sum of several signals). Since both the inputs and outputs to the FFT are sequential, the SOS check is also done sequentially using accumulators that are compared at the end of the block. This is shown in Fig. 5. To minimize the impact of roundoffs on the fault coverage, the outputs of the accumulator are 39-bit wide. For the evaluation, several values of the number of parallel FFTs in the original system. The error detection and correction blocks (Figs. 1–3) are implemented as multiplexers that select the correct output depending on the error pattern detected. As mentioned before, these blocks are tripled to ensure that errors that affect them do not corrupt the final outputs.



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	ECC	PARITY- SOS	PARITY- SOS-ECC
Gate count	16735	10561	9584
Flipflops	392	236	225
LUT	612	508	388
Slices	419	331	284
Power (mW)	263	253	252

Table.4.1. Comparison Table

The objective is to illustrate how the relative overheads of the different techniques vary with the number of parallel FFTs. In parentheses, the cost relative to an unprotected implementation is also provided. The results show that all techniques have a cost factor of <2. This demonstrates that the ECC-based

technique proposed in [17] is also competitive to protect FFTs and requires a much lower cost than TMR. The parity-SOS-ECC technique has the lowest resource use in all cases and, therefore, is the best option to minimize the implementation cost. This is expected from the discussion in Section II and the initial estimates presented in Table II. On the other hand, the parity-SOS scheme needs less resources than the ECC scheme when the number of FFTs is 4, 6, or 8 but more when the number of FFTs is 11. This can be explained as in the ECC scheme, the number of additional FFTs grows logarithmically with the number of FFTs, while in the

parity-SOS technique, the number of SOS checks grows linearly. This means that as the number of FFTs to protect increases, the ECC scheme becomes more competitive. For the parity-SOS-ECC scheme, the number of SOS checks also grows logarithmically and

they are simpler to implement than FFTs.

V. CONCLUSION

The protection of parallel FFTs execution against soft errors has been studied. Two techniques have been proposed and evaluated. The proposed techniques are based on combining an existing ECC approach with the traditional SOS check. The SOS Checks are used to detect and locate the errors and a simple parity FFT is used for correction. The detection and location of the errors can be done using an SOS check per FFT or alternatively using a set of SOS checks that form an ECC. The proposed techniques have been evaluated both in terms of implementation complexity and error detection capabilities. The results show that the second technique, which uses parity FFT and a set of SOS checks that form an ECC, provides the best results in terms of implementation complexity and finding more than one errors. In terms of error protection, fault injection experiments show that the ECC scheme can recover all the errors that are out of the tolerance range. The fault coverage for the parity-SOS scheme and the parity-SOS-ECC scheme is 99.9% when the tolerance level for SOS check is 1.

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